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摩根:這座“超級(jí)中國大使館”,藏著中英關(guān)系的走勢(shì)圖
Hello everyone, my name’s Morgan, and today I would like to talk about plans for a new “super embassy” in London.
This move is attracting a lot of attention online, not just for its size and location, but for what it might say about the future of Sino–China relations.
The proposal would see China’s embassy move from the outskirts of London to a much more central location, right next to the City of London, the world’s second largest financial hub.
Dubbed a “super embassy” largely due to its size, the planned complex would cover approximately 620,000 square feet on the former site of the historic Royal Mint. The design includes a cultural centre and accommodation for around 200 staff.
Initially, plans for the “super embassy” were frozen by the local council. However, following the Labour Party’s election victory last July, the project was revived and placed under the oversight of Deputy Prime Minister Angela Rayner. If completed, it would be China’s largest diplomatic mission in Europe.
The decision to restart the project came just a week after British Chancellor Rachel Reeves visited China to build momentum for a reset in UK–China relations. She was accompanied by a high-profile delegation of UK business leaders, including HSBC Chair Mark Tucker, Bank of England Governor Andrew Bailey, and the Chief Executive of the Financial Conduct Authority. In Beijing, they met with her counterpart, Vice Premier He Lifeng.
From China’s perspective, this new embassy represents a modern base for diplomacy, consular services, and cultural exchange. For the UK, it could be an opportunity to deepen dialogue, attract investment, and showcase London’s openness to international engagement.
Of course, there has been some debate in Britain, especially from the Conservative Party — with critics pointing to the site’s proximity to sensitive infrastructure.
As government ministers prepare to make a decision in the coming weeks, one of the main sticking points has been the inclusion of certain blacked-out sections in the building plans submitted for approval.
The inclusion of redactions are not unusual. For example, it is standard practice for US embassies to include a “secure core” in their designs, with these areas routinely omitted from public plans.
To ease concerns, the official Chinese response has been clear: “The Chinese embassy in the UK is committed to promoting understanding and friendship between the two peoples. We hope the UK side will consider and approve this planning application based on the merits of the matter and relevant professional opinions.”
Even so, mixed public opinion has kept the project widely covered in the British media and discussed internationally. Some commentators have suggested there may be an element of double standards — with other countries given more freedom in their embassy designs while China faces stricter scrutiny. At the same time, media outlets have noted both public unease and reported opposition from the United States.
It’s worth remembering that this comes after several rocky years in UK–China relations. During and after COVID, ties cooled sharply. When I was writing my master’s thesis, I examined Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s decision to remove Huawei from the UK’s 5G networks — a move widely seen, both in academic circles and by former ministers, as the result of strong pressure from Washington.
My conclusion was much the same: post-Brexit, Britain’s room for manoeuvre was smaller, and the Huawei decision became a visible example of how closely London aligned with US preferences. This was all the more striking given that UK security agencies at the time maintained that Huawei posed no national security risk.
Part of Washington’s unease stemmed from the perception that, during the post-Brexit “golden era” of relations, the UK was drawing closer to China than ever before. The US feared this could weaken UK–US military and economic cooperation, with potential domino effects for American influence in Europe and beyond.
Following the Obama presidency, the first Trump administration made it a priority to pressure the UK to scale back its engagement with China. Even though the then–Prime Minister described himself as a “Sinophile”, President Trump employed his trademark “carrot and stick” approach — the carrot being the prospect of a trade deal with the United States, and the stick left deliberately vague (though widely assumed to be tariffs). With Huawei as its most visible flashpoint, this pressure campaign ultimately contributed to the UK scaling back its engagement with China.
Indeed, post-Brexit, the UK has often found itself more reliant on the US economically and strategically, making it more susceptible to American preferences. Moreover, it no longer has the security that came with being part of the EU single market.
Fast forward to today, and there are signs of a shift. On a recent visit to Chongqing, a British deputy mayor was even seen buying a Chinese-made Honor phone — a massive divergence from the days when Chinese technology was viewed almost entirely through a security lens.
The economic logic is clear. China is a major link in global supply chains, particularly in refining rare earth minerals used in electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy technologies. Post-Brexit, the UK is actively seeking new investment partners, and just weeks after the embassy plans moved forward, the finance minister secured £6 million in Chinese investment during a visit to Beijing.
That re-engagement is already producing results. In Chongqing, British delegates signed multiple cooperation agreements, including Chinese energy company EcoFlow’s plan to open a new headquarters in Birmingham. East Midlands Deputy Mayor Nadine Peatfield summed up the mood, saying there was “a real hunger and appetite to rekindle those relationships” — a sentiment that recalls the so-called “golden era” of UK–China relations. A period of sustained warming in relations was perhaps best captured in a now-famous photo of then–Prime Minister David Cameron and President Xi Jinping sharing fish and chips in a pub, alongside a cheeky pint. The image went viral, celebrated both as a classic example of soft diplomacy and as a moment of genuine cultural connection.
The embassy project still requires final approval. Parts of the planning documents remain redacted, and a decision is expected in September. But the fact that discussions are taking place against a backdrop of renewed political will shows that both sides see value in rebuilding trust.
Ultimately, this embassy won’t just be about bricks and mortar. It symbolises that, despite past tensions and external pressures, there remains space for the UK and China to focus on cooperation, mutual benefit, and friendship between peoples.
本文系觀察者網(wǎng)獨(dú)家稿件,文章內(nèi)容純屬作者個(gè)人觀點(diǎn),不代表平臺(tái)觀點(diǎn),未經(jīng)授權(quán),不得轉(zhuǎn)載,否則將追究法律責(zé)任。關(guān)注觀察者網(wǎng)微信guanchacn,每日閱讀趣味文章。
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本文僅代表作者個(gè)人觀點(diǎn)。
- 責(zé)任編輯: 郭涵 
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