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Han Hua：So the first thing first, as the NDB is celebrating its 10th anniversary, how do you evaluate the past decade?

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：Well, the NDB is a very important initiative that we as BRICS took. It's an ambitious project. The amount of capital put into the bank by the founding members, and also a little bit by the new members, is very significant. It's one of the largest multilateral development banks in terms of capital in the world. And we have around the table the founding members, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, as well as a few new members that came in. So now the bank is in place. It has a beautiful building in Shanghai, it has about 100 employees, has approved a lot of projects, disbursed quite a lot.

But I am sort of disappointed with the progress made in the first 10 years by the bank that I helped to found. Ten years ago exactly, the bank began to function in Shanghai. And 10 years is maybe too short a period from a Chinese perspective, but a long one from Brazilian perspective, we are more immediatist. I think we could have achieved more in 10 years.

For example, we were always aiming for a global bank as an alternative to the World Bank. But you cannot be a global bank with only 10 members after 10 years of existence. That's a disappointment. We should work harder to bring in new countries, new developing countries, emerging market countries into the bank. That's one thing.

The other thing is that although we, as BRICS countries, we speak a lot about de-dollarization, the major institution we created, which is the NDB, is still—not fully, but substantially dollarized on the asset and on the liability sides. So we must work harder to rely more on national currencies other than the dollar or the euro for the operations we do as a bank. But mostly I think the bank is doing fine. I just gave two examples of the several challenges that I see in the bank.

Han Hua：So, you are suggesting some disappointment regarding NDB’s development over the past 10 years. You’re suggesting there may be a serious lack of its agenda, set 10 years ago, in terms of the membership countries, in terms of its de-dollarization agenda. So what else? What's the priorities you think from now, from the 11th years of its development, which should be taken priority?

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：Let me give you a few other examples of where I think we are lagging in the NDB. For example, it's very important for an institution to respect its governance rules, to strictly apply the rules that were created by the countries. And this sometimes does not happen in the bank on a number of important issues. That's one thing.

Another is that, for reasons that I do not understand, a number of important positions in the bank have not been filled in after 10 years. There are several cases. One that comes to my mind is the position of chief economist, which was envisaged when I was there between 2015 and 2017. For some reason, we never managed to select a good economist and put keep him there. Not necessarily a national of a BRICS country, maybe even a national of another country. But we have not done that. That's an example of some sort of slowness.

The other thing is that communication and transparency are weak. You know, strangely, the transparency of the NDB is less than that of the IMF or the World Bank. It provides less information to the outside public than the Bretton Woods institutions, which is also a problem.

So, I think we need to make progress in all these matters, also on the effectiveness of projects. Since we don't know any details about the projects that the NDB is undertaking, the bank does not make them public, we cannot assess this crucial aspect. But here is a suspicion on the part of some people, that some of the projects are not conducted very efficiently.

In sum, maybe we need Chinese patience, a long run view, but it is fair to say that the bank needs to do more. With former president of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, as president of the bank, one important thing happened, among others. The bank was being forgotten in the world in the last years. When she came in, being a former president of a country, she automatically raised the profile of the bank, something which is quite important. For instance, President Xi Jinping visited the bank in Shanghai. This never happened before. And so, the bank is gaining visibility, which I think is a very important point for any international institution

Han Hua：That shows the, like you said, Dilma's personal charisma as well as capability, as a large country's former president. So this is quite important. And you mentioned some internal issues regarding next step development.

And they are facing a lot of external change, that we don't have the luxury or patience to wait, such as the movements towards de-dollarization, globalization, multilateral governance, which all needs NDB to play a more important role; also how to settle the trade and other cooperation among the BRICS using the local currencies. So what do you think of these external pressures as well as changing motivations?

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：You see, I think the NDB, as well as the contingent reserve arrangement that we created at the same time, the monetary fund of the BRICS, they are institutions that are conceived to be alternatives to the Western-dominated institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. I wouldn't say they are anti-Western, I would say they are post-Western, to use an expression used in a debate we had here in Rio by Zhao Long.

I think that's an apt way of putting it, because when we conceive alternatives, we do not believe that they should exclude Western countries, potentially. Maybe the Western countries are too proud and arrogant to join initiatives that the BRICS might take, but we should be open to that. Because the BRICS are not in the business of creating problems, conflicts. We are in the business of solving the problems of the BRICS and other countries, other emerging market and developing countries.

Han Hua：So, what do you think, then, should be the goal of the BRICS in this regard? How would you comment on the role of PBOC? You mentioned PBOC in our debate the day before. So what role has the PBOC played in this de-dollarization movement, or alternatively, what role will the cryptocurrencies play in either helping or hindering the process of de-dollarization?

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：Let me say that the PBOC has played a role that is very important in the world, because it's initiating a number of currency swap agreements with dozens of countries around the world, through which it supplies not only US dollars, but also Chinese currency. This is a source of balance of payment support for a number of countries. Argentina, for example, has relied substantially on that. The PBOC is doing, more effectively, what we could have done and have not yet done as BRICS in the Contingent Reserve Arrangement. Because in the CRA, to use the acronym,  our central banks, and the Brazilian central bank is one of the worst in this respect, have frozen the arrangement since 2015. We have not done any operations. We have not yet allowed currencies other than the US dollar to be used in the CRA. We have not yet allowed the new members of the BRICS political formation to come in. We need to expand the CRA and make it more flexible, so that we can provide as a group an alternative to the IMF that often works unfavorably to developing countries that need balance of payments support.

Han Hua：But how to expand, how to work in line with this, like work shoulder by shoulder in this regard?

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：Well, the governance of this Contingent Reserve Arrangement that I helped to create, because I was in the negotiations that led to its creation, is a bit too rigid; it should have been more flexible from the beginning. But our central banks were always making it difficult to make the arrangement flexible. Not so much, I think, the PBOC. The PBOC was more cooperative and more willing to present alternatives and proposals in the negotiation.

But, for example, the Brazilian Central Bank, not only the Brazilian Central Bank, but let me mention our central bank, was always very afraid that this mechanism could compromise Brazilian reserves in possible lending to South Africa. South Africa is seen as a potential taker. And, strangely enough, the Central Bank of South Africa was also very rigid in the definition of the arrangement.

But still, with all the shortcomings of the way we put it together, the CRA is there and we could flexibilize and expand it. There's nothing that prohibits the entry of new countries into the CRA. And it would also be interesting to expand the size of the CRA, increase the size of the pool. For example, take a country like Ethiopia that recently joined the BRICS political formation. Why not have Ethiopia in our monetary fund, in our CRA? Because Ethiopia actually needs balance of payments support. And this would help Ethiopia become less dependent on the IMF. So, it's important geopolitically to have this arrangement function well. And I'm sorry to say that after 10 years of existence, it's practically frozen. The NDB has made some progress. But the CRA, the monetary fund of the BRICS, has made very little progress.

Han Hua：Yeah, PBOC is taking a flexible approach in doing so, and having some of its sub-branches to make—it's in line with the spirit of touching the stone and testing water. You mentioned the case of Ethiopia. I think that could be something that your central bank is doing more aggressively on this.

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：The Brazilian Central bank is, and mind you, not the current governor appointed by President Lula. But the machinery of the institution is extremely conservative and also Western-oriented. It does not really look favorably on initiatives like the one we took 10 years ago. This hampers the functioning of the CRA.

Han Hua：On this, I have to share with you that in PBOC or in the financial system within China, there is always this mood, about 10 years ago and until now, there is always this Western mood, because most of the top level as well as the middle level management team are educated in the Western countries, especially in the United States. So, there is something Western oriented by instinct. But then there is another driver to do this thing, maybe it's not that anti-Western, but doing something with our own characteristics. This is like two movements, parallel. So, we will also wait to see, but certainly PBOC sounds flexible.

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：I think that's one of the weaknesses of our countries, in varying degrees. There's too much Western influence in the societies and the governments. Even in the case of China, I understand that there is this problem also, but less than in a country like Brazil, where the forces that look to the United States and criticize the BRICS are more important than they are in China. Even Russia, a country effectively at war with the West through Ukraine, even there, my Russian friends tell me, they have these fifth columns, these people oriented towards the West. There's a classical term for that in Russia, Westerners, Occidentalists, that goes back to the 19th century. This remains to this day an issue in Russia. If you look at countries like Mexico, Argentina, Brazil to a lesser extent, Ethiopia and Egypt, you won’t fail to notice that they are very influenced by Western forces. And this is not always good. Often it's bad. Often it destabilizes countries. It hampers their development.

Han Hua：Glad people are realizing that. It's too Western oriented. After all, it's about 80 years at least of this westernization since the so-called new liberal international order. This leads us to this question very naturally in this age of rising geopolitical issues. Do multilateral organizations like the UN, WTO, or the IMF still have hope of functioning effectively?

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：Well, the WTO is in a crisis. It's effectively dead, at least for now. It's the worst case of paralysis among international institutions. And this is partly due, not only, but partly to the action of the United States that is not allowing the WTO to function as foreseen.

The UN is not so bad, but even there you have a sort of paralysis. For example, the Security Council rarely reaches the consensus needed to take decisions. There's always one country at least vetoing any major movement of the Security Council.

The IMF is a little better. I was there, as you know, for eight years from 2007 to 2015. I know the institution pretty well. We have made some progress there, especially in the reforms of 2008 and 2010, in which I participated. These reforms led to an increase in the role of the developing countries, their voting power and quotas. China notably rose, Brazil also.

And today it's important to note that if we coordinate effectively as BRICS or BRICS Plus inside the IMF, we hold veto power over decisions requiring an 85% majority. These are sometimes very important. However, veto power is a negative force. As BRICS, we do not enjoy sufficient support to make positive changes.

And I can tell you, the change in quotas and votes that happened in 2008, 2010, are the largest changes ever made in the institution. They are in place. However, they do not fundamentally change the hold of the West on the institution.

The IMF is so conservative that in all its history, for the first time, there was a significant move in quotas and votes in the 2008 and 2010 reforms. Not a fundamental change, as I said. But the worst part of this is that nothing has happened since, 15 years later. The process of change in IMF governance has not moved an inch since. And I don't expect that it will move forward in the foreseeable future.

I think we should be realistic. The IMF and the World Bank, controlled by the West, will not make any changes of fundamental nature. We can work together for partial adjustments, which might be useful for the institutions. But the Western grip on the IMF and the World Bank is strong and will remain so . And you know, one reason why they are reluctant elected to move forward is China. Because under any metric that you might want to choose, China should be much larger in the IMF and the World Bank than it currently is. And the United States and Europe, simply do not want that. So, this paralyzes completely any fundamental change in governance; this is one of the major reasons that paralyze the reform of the Fund and the Bank. So, let's continue to build our own mechanisms . The IMF and the World Bank will work only to a certain extent, because of their inertia as institutions and the Western view that they must control the process.

Han Hua：So that shows how important NDB is down the road. So how should NDB fill in this gap of lacking the governance and the progress? And speaking of the veto power as well, President Rousseff, mentioned in yesterday's press conference, saying that every country needs to be heard, no veto power in the NDB's governance. Forgive my ignorance, how these two goals can be matched together?

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：Well, President Dilma Rousseff is quite right, because we conceived the New Development Bank as a more flexible institution that would take into account the interests of the countries that resort to the bank, not dictate rules, but respect the rules and policies that already exist in the any country that comes to us to obtain loans.

As you know, that's often not the case. The World Bank, for example, is always trying to change the system in the borrowing country, introduce conditionalities; it's very common, as well as the IMF, as you also know. Now, when we constructed the NDB, we conceived it as an alternative to the World Bank, not to the IMF.

The alternative to the IMF was supposed to be the Contingent Reserve Arrangement of which we spoke. But practically speaking, the CRA is frozen by our central banks. So, we must be flexible to allow the NDB to fulfill some balance of payment support operations. Loans that can help countries that are facing foreign exchange difficulties.

Han Hua：Even non BRICS countries?

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：Even non BRICS countries, but perhaps they should be members of the NDB. For example, Bangladesh is not a member of the BRICS political formation, but it's a member of the NDB, so we can help countries like Bangladesh and others to face up to possible balance of payments difficulties.

It's not strictly compatible with our initial plans. But we can adapt our plans as time goes by to face the needs of the BRICS process and of the developing countries.

Han Hua：So ideally, for example, in the next three years, what's the quantity of the NDB members in your mind? And what's about the quality of its progress in your mind?

Paulo Nogeira Batista Jr：Well, as I said, we have the five founding members and four new countries only: Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Bangladesh, and Algeria. Seven if you count Uruguay, that has yet to complete parliamentary procedures, and Colombia and Uzbekistan that have very recently been approved as new members by the Board of Governors of the NDB. Now, this is fine, but we need much more. We need to have a large number of countries in all regions of the world, in Latin America, in Africa, in the Middle East, in South Asia, in East Asia. We need to strive for that, because look at the membership of the World Bank, 190 countries; the IMF has also 190 countries. We should be able to build a structure capable of dealing with a large number of countries.

Of course, we cannot do that suddenly. We need to do it step by step. Also, to be realistic, some countries may not want to join the bank. They might feel that it's not in their interest to join the bank.

Han Hua：Maybe they grow so comfortable with the current structure like IMF or World Bank.

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：That's right. Some are politically closer to the West and are reluctant to enter into a BRICS initiative. For example, Mexico, a great country, but structurally very linked to the United States. Even with President Claudia Sheinbaum, so much more independent than some other Mexican presidents.

And also there's a subtle point, which is a mistake we made when we constructed the NDB. In the structure of the bank, too much weight is given to the five founding members. So other countries that are large would ask, why should I be able to get a small quota? For example, Indonesia. We would like to see Indonesia in the bank. But perhaps the reason why Indonesia doesn't come in is that it's a very large country, very important, larger than South Africa, for example. And why should it obtain, because of the governance rules we formulated, a small share of quotas in voting power?

Han Hua：How small?

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：It depends on the exact calculations, but you know, the five founding members entered initially with 20% each, and there's a limit. They cannot fall below 55% of the voting power. This creates a restriction because countries like Turkey and Indonesia, for example, are too large to be treated as small countries. Although Turkey may not be politically willing to join.

So ,with the governance rules that we now have, we can expand mostly with small countries. That's important too. There are many small countries around the world that want to join the bank, and we should allow them to come in. But I recognize that we made a mistake in the negotiations.

Han Hua：Do we have a chance to fix that?

Paulo Nogeira Batista Jr：We need to amend the Articles of Agreement. But that's always a challenge.

Han Hua：Is it on the agenda of the next five years plan?

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：I never heard that it is on the agenda. I would suggest that it be. If I could make a suggestion, we should amend the Articles. But I recognize that the amendment of the Articles is always a slow process. It has to go through Parliament or other internal procedures of the countries involved.

Unfortunately, we made that mistake. To correct it is difficult, but not impossible. And this would be important to allow the bank to take in new members that are as large as or even larger than founding members.

Han Hua：But probably, even with this process in the long run, currently there can be some measures to be taken, to let the small members or the new members, to realize that they have some weight that is bigger than their voting weight in the system. What kind of measures that can be taken?

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：This is more something internal to the bank. The president and the vice presidents need to be willing to accommodate and listen to, give a voice to the new members, even if they're very small. It's a matter of practice, of attitude, which I believe is not often there. Unfortunately, this is not often there.

Han Hua：Dilma has a lot to do.

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：Dilma has a lot to do. And there's another difficulty that should be mentioned. The bank issues bonds in the international markets, it has a credit rating. This credit rating might be hurt depending on the kind of country that comes in.

I'm totally in favor of Iran, for example, joining the bank. In fact, Iran was the first country to come to us back in 2015 to join the bank. And I supported Iran's request from inside the bank at that time, But I recognized there was a problem, that Iran would perhaps lower the credit rating of the bank and make it more expensive for us to fund in the capital markets. So, if Iran is to come in, it should come in together with countries that have a better credit rating. This neutralizes the downgrade.

Han Hua：Is there any project-based measures that can be on one way to take Iran's concern into consideration by NDB, but do not risk lowering the whole thing?

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：I think there is another possibility even if Iran does not join the bank. Our governance structure, our Articles of Agreement allow the bank in exceptional circumstances to lend to a country that is not a member. So, we could try that.

Han Hua：We have this clause, right?

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：We have this clause already.

Han Hua：You have also some practices, right?

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：I believe there's very few. I think only one or two South African projects with countries very small and very near to South Africa. Lesotho, for example. But these are exceptions. I think that geopolitically speaking, we need to support Iran. Iran is under attack by the United States and Israel.

So, one way of supporting Iran would be to allow some projects, a few at least, to test the waters between the NDB and Iran. But I don't know if that is being discussed. You know, sometimes our people are too conservative, too orthodox. and a little bit too Western oriented. So, they might be afraid to allow the bank to operate with Iran, but that's not the correct attitude. We have, I believe, a duty to help countries that are being unfairly treated, and Iran is one.

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